I. Introduction: Historical Precedent and Contemporary Strategy
1.1. The Holodomor (1932–1933) as a Template of Control through Hunger
Historical precedents show that the use of food as an instrument of political terror and control is a deeply rooted strategy of the Russian state machinery. In 1932–1933 the Soviet authorities, led by Joseph Stalin, carried out the artificial Holodomor, which resulted in the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, primarily from the rural population.¹ This tragedy, whose very term literally means “death caused by hunger,” was a planned act aimed at suppressing Ukrainian national resistance and ensuring rigid centralist control over all spheres of life.²
From the standpoint of international law, the actions of the Soviet authorities during the Holodomor fall under Article II(c) of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”² Key mechanisms of control used at that time included the total confiscation not only of grain but of any food stocks, as well as the creation of administrative blockades (of districts, villages) that prevented peasants from leaving their homes in search of food and forcibly returned those who fled.²
This policy of combining the seizure of a vital resource (grain) with geographic isolation (blockade) is a historical model that is being reproduced today by the Russian Federation. The current strategy mirrors this logic: mass theft and destruction of agricultural infrastructure are combined with a naval blockade of the Black Sea, transforming local terror into an instrument of global blackmail.
1.2. Grain as a Strategic Target and Weapon of War
The attack on Ukraine’s agricultural sector is unprecedented in scale since the Second World War, especially given its global significance.³ Before the full-scale invasion, the agricultural sector accounted for 20–22% of Ukraine’s GDP and 40% of its export revenues, and was critically important for feeding millions of people around the world.³
According to FAO experts, as early as April 2022 the direct damage to Ukraine’s agri-food sector amounted to 6.4 billion USD. This level of damage includes the destruction of irrigation infrastructure, storage facilities, machinery, equipment, and port infrastructure.³ The strategic goal of Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian grain is a dual blow: to undermine Ukraine’s economic resilience, which heavily depends on agricultural exports, and at the same time to use the fear of global hunger, caused by shortages, as a lever of political influence on the international community.⁴ In this way, food is turned into a weapon with a global multiplier effect.
II. Economic Looting: Systematic Theft and Destruction of Agricultural Capital
2.1. The Mechanism of State Theft: Volumes and Logistics
The theft of Ukrainian grain is not a chaotic act but a systematic, organized operation that demonstrates economic looting on a state scale. By May 2022, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Agrarian Policy estimated the amount of stolen grain at “several hundred thousand tonnes,” and later at at least 400,000 tonnes.⁵ These operations involve both private companies and Russian state structures, including the State Grain Operator.
The logistics of the theft include transporting harvests from occupied territories through Crimea to Russian ports such as Novorossiysk. A significant share of this grain is then mixed with legitimate Russian commodities to complicate tracing and export to world markets.⁵ The deliberate destruction of means of production is an integral part of this strategy. According to the World Bank (RDNA4), the largest direct damages were recorded in Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, which together account for 65% of the total.⁶
2.2. Quantitative Analysis of Losses in the Agro-industrial Complex
Economic assessments of war-related losses distinguish between direct damage to assets and overall indirect losses. Total direct damage in the agricultural sector, including physical destruction and theft, is estimated at 11.2 billion USD. However, total indirect losses caused by the war (including reduced yields, increased costs, and disrupted logistics) reach the colossal sum of 72.7 billion USD.⁷
The structure of direct damage clearly points to Russia’s strategic intent to undermine Ukraine’s long-term economic resilience:
58% of total direct damage results from the destruction, damage, and theft of machinery and equipment.
17% of damage is due to destroyed storage facilities and grain silos (elevators).
Another 17% is the theft of input (e.g., seed) and output (grain) resources.⁶
This breakdown demonstrates that Russia is deliberately seizing mobile capital (agricultural machinery) and destroying critical infrastructure (storage facilities). These actions ensure that even after de-occupation agricultural activity cannot quickly recover. This is a consistent policy aimed at destroying agricultural infrastructure and economic independence.
Indirect losses are of particular importance. As a result of the Russian blockade of exports, farm gate prices for corn and wheat in Ukraine fell by 45%, despite rising global prices.⁸ Losses caused by lower domestic prices due to disrupted export logistics cost Ukrainian farmers 24.1 billion USD. World Bank research confirms that economic losses caused by increased transport costs due to the blockade reduced Ukrainian farmers’ profitability by more than 60%, exceeding losses from direct crop damage in conflict areas.⁹ Thus, the naval blockade has proved to be the most destructive economic instrument.
Category of Damage/Loss | Estimated Value (Billion USD) | Breakdown of Direct Damage | Source
Total Direct Damage to Assets (Damage)
11.2 | N/A | World Bank RDNA4⁷Total War-Related Losses (Losses)
72.7 | N/A | World Bank RDNA4⁷Damage/Theft of Machinery and Equipment
58% | Part of 11.2 billion | World Bank RDNA4⁶Destruction of Storage Facilities and Elevators
17% | Part of 11.2 billion | World Bank RDNA4⁶Theft of Input and Output Resources
17% | Part of 11.2 billion | World Bank RDNA4⁶Loss of Income due to Price Decline (Blockade)
24.1 | Part of 72.7 billion | EPRS analysis⁸
III. Black Sea Blockade: Food as a Geopolitical Weapon
3.1. Legal Prohibition of Collective Punishment
The termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in 2023 and subsequent targeted missile and drone strikes on the ports of Odesa and terminals on the Danube were not only a military tactic but also an act of global blackmail. The United Nations has officially stated that Russia is “turning food into a weapon,” using hunger as a lever of political influence (as noted in the initial article).
From a legal perspective, these actions fall under the direct prohibition of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Under Article 54 of Additional Protocol I, it is prohibited to starve the civilian population as a method of warfare and to attack, destroy or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs or agricultural areas.¹⁰ Legal analyses indicate that if Russia targets food infrastructure in order to put pressure on global civilian food supplies and thereby achieve the lifting of certain economic sanctions, this constitutes prohibited targeting of objects necessary for survival “for their food value.”¹¹
3.2. Global Consequences: Price Shock and African Dependence
The blockade has led to a sharp increase in international food prices, sparking fears of a global food crisis.⁸ The significance of the BSGI is underscored by the fact that 65% of exports under its framework went to developing countries.⁸
African and Middle Eastern states are the most vulnerable to disruptions in Ukrainian grain supplies.⁴ The vast majority of Sub-Saharan African countries (with the exception of Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda, and Zambia) are critically dependent on wheat imports.¹² Thus, price increases caused by the Russian blockade have had the most devastating impact precisely on these regions. Russia is consciously using this dependence as leverage. By creating global shortages and the threat of hunger, Moscow gains political advantage, which it amplifies through disinformation campaigns claiming that it allegedly “does not steal grain from Ukraine and does not block supplies.”¹³
3.3. Adaptation and Resilience: The Ukrainian Corridor
Despite the aggression, Ukraine has shown significant adaptability. After the termination of the BSGI, the country launched its own temporary maritime corridor, which substantially improved export logistics.⁷ This adaptation proved successful: the share of sea transport through Odesa’s ports rose to 85% in 2024 (compared to 52% in 2023), which made it possible to reduce total transport costs almost to pre-war levels.¹⁵
Although the success of the Ukrainian maritime corridor has prevented Russia from achieving its strategic goal of completely strangling Ukraine economically through the naval blockade, the cumulative economic losses remain colossal. At the same time, the restoration of maritime transport underscores the long-term limitations of Russia’s naval strategy.
IV. Legal Analysis: Hunger as a Method of Warfare
4.1. Article 54 of Additional Protocol I: Direct Prohibition
International Humanitarian Law contains strict norms prohibiting the use of hunger as a method of warfare. This prohibition is enshrined in Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and is recognized as part of customary international law.¹⁰ The prohibition covers acts aimed at destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, including crops, agricultural land, irrigation systems, and food stores.¹⁰
It is worth noting that neither Ukraine nor Russia submitted reservations to Article 54, and Russian armed forces, in their own 2001 internal normative acts, also prohibit the use of starvation of the civilian population to achieve military aims.¹⁷ This confirms that the Russian military leadership is aware of the illegality of such actions but deliberately ignores this.
4.2. Analysis of Intent: Denial of Food Value
A key element in classifying attacks on food infrastructure as a war crime is proof of intent. The targeting of, for example, missile strikes on grain terminals, elevators, and warehouses that do not provide direct military support to combatants indicates an intent specifically to deny their food value.
Analysis shows that since attacks on food infrastructure were coordinated with the termination of the BSGI and accompanied by demands for the easing of economic sanctions, the intent was political: to exert pressure on global food supplies.¹¹ This act transforms the destruction of food infrastructure from mere material damage into a war crime, as it is a deliberate use of food as an instrument of blackmail against the global civilian population. If the objective is to obtain political concessions by harming global food security, this constitutes a violation of the prohibition on targeting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.¹¹
V. Systemic Abuse: Starvation and Torture of Prisoners of War and Detainees
5.1. Violations of the Third Geneva Convention (GC III)
One of the darkest aspects of Russia’s contemporary strategy is the systematic use of hunger and deprivation of basic needs as methods of torture against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian detainees. Reports by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the OSCE have documented large-scale and systematic violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III).¹⁸
Most of the 215 released civilians interviewed by the UN gave consistent testimonies about beatings, mock executions, the use of electric shocks, and prolonged starvation, along with inadequate medical care.¹⁸ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has warned of “widespread and systematic” torture of Ukrainian POWs.¹⁹ Over 95% of released POWs reported violations of detention conditions, including lack of adequate food and medical care.²⁰
5.2. Evidence of Intentional Exhaustion
The deliberate use of hunger as torture is confirmed by quantitative evidence. OHCHR reports record that 171 POWs (including 21 women) reported significant weight loss. Many lost up to a quarter, and some up to a third, of their total body mass.²¹ Driving people to such a state of physical exhaustion through systematic undernourishment is a direct violation of human dignity and of the Geneva Conventions.
Such severe and deliberate weight loss due to insufficient nutrition is not mere negligence, but a targeted act intended to inflict severe physical and mental suffering and thus meets the definition of torture. As this practice is “widespread and systematic,”¹⁹ it meets the criteria for crimes against humanity. This directly parallels methods used in the GULAG system, where hunger was an instrument of control, humiliation, and physical punishment.
VI. Historical Continuity: From the Holodomor to Contemporary Crimes
6.1. Comparison of Control Mechanisms
Analysis of the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine reveals direct reproduction of methods used by the Stalinist regime to physically destroy and suppress Ukrainian independence. The common denominator lies in the strategic use of hunger to achieve military and political goals.
Comparison of blockades:
Holodomor (1930s): Hunger was ensured through an internal administrative blockade (bans on leaving villages, confiscation of food) to physically isolate the peasantry and prevent them from seeking food.²
Contemporary Aggression (2020s): Hunger and economic harm are ensured through an external naval blockade and targeted destruction of food infrastructure, aimed at isolating the entire country from global markets and undermining its economic independence.¹¹
6.2. Repetition of Genocidal Act II(c)
The body of evidence—systematic resource seizure (theft of millions of tonnes of grain and equipment), destruction of infrastructure necessary for survival, and deliberate starvation of persons under Russia’s control (POWs and detainees)—creates “conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction” of the target group. Taken together, these actions form a serious basis for investigating genocidal intent under Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention.²
The use of methods historically employed as part of the USSR’s genocidal policy against Ukrainians is reinforced by contemporary Russian state rhetoric of “denazification,” which, according to legal experts, is part of a campaign of dehumanization and denial of the existence of the Ukrainian national group as such.²² The destruction of cultural heritage alongside methods of physical exhaustion and torture, including hunger, are interrelated elements aimed at destroying the Ukrainian nation at least in part.²²
Policy/Action | Holodomor (1932–1933) | Contemporary Russian Aggression (2022–…) | Legal Qualification
Confiscation/Theft of Food
Holodomor: Total confiscation of all food stocks from peasants.²
Today: Systematic theft of millions of tonnes of grain; expropriation of 58% of machinery and 17% of storage facilities.⁵
→ War crime (pillage); deprivation of means of subsistence.Blockade and Isolation
Holodomor: Internal administrative blockade of districts and villages; prohibition on seeking food.²
Today: External naval blockade of the Black Sea; deliberate destruction of terminals.¹¹
→ Use of hunger as a method of warfare (IHL, Art. 54).Conditions of Detention
Holodomor era: Hunger and exhaustion as methods of control in the GULAG system.
Today: Deliberate, systematic starvation of POWs and civilians (weight loss of up to one third of body mass).²⁰
→ Torture and inhuman treatment (war crime / crime against humanity).Strategic Intent
Holodomor: Destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry; suppression of national resistance.²
Today: Economic exhaustion; political blackmail; signs of intent to partially destroy the Ukrainian nation.²²
→ Deliberate creation of conditions for physical destruction (Genocide Convention, Art. II(c)).
VII. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
7.1. Conclusion: A Two-Front Hunger Strategy
The analysis confirms that the Russian Federation is pursuing a deliberate, two-track hunger strategy that directly derives from the practices of the Stalinist regime.
Internal Front (Physical Destruction): The systematic use of hunger as torture against detainees and prisoners of war (with up to 33% body mass loss) is an institutional means of physical control, humiliation, and manipulation.²⁰ This meets the criteria of crimes against humanity.
External Front (Economic Strangulation): The use of naval blockade and deliberate destruction of critical agricultural infrastructure, which totals 11.2 billion USD in direct damage, is an instrument of economic strangulation of Ukraine and geopolitical blackmail of the global food system.⁶ This qualifies as a war crime under Article 54 of IHL.¹¹
Taken together, these actions—including economic looting (72.7 billion USD in total losses) and deliberate attack on means of subsistence—bear the hallmarks of crimes aimed at the total or partial physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation. This requires thorough investigation for compliance with the criteria of the Genocide Convention.⁷
7.2. Avenues of Accountability
To ensure comprehensive accountability, the international community should take the following steps:
Strengthen Investigations of War Crimes: International coordination is needed to gather evidence regarding violations of Article 54 of Additional Protocol I (use of hunger as a method of warfare) and GC III (systematic starvation of POWs).²³
Classification as Crimes against Humanity: The systematic starvation and torture of prisoners of war and civilians, confirmed by UN and OSCE reports, should be classified as crimes against humanity due to their widespread and systematic nature.
Investigation of Genocidal Intent: Legal analysis of the presence of dolus specialis (specific intent) of genocide must continue, combining evidence of physical destruction (through hunger and torture) with Russian state rhetoric of dehumanization and denial of Ukrainian identity.²²
7.3. Recommendations for Resilience and Reconstruction
International support should focus on neutralizing the long-term economic consequences of the hunger strategy:
Economic Reconstruction of the Agricultural Sector: Priority funding for restoring critical agricultural infrastructure, including replacing stolen machinery (58% of direct damage) and rebuilding storage facilities (17% of direct damage).⁶ This is essential for restoring Ukraine’s economic resilience and preventing long-term dependence.
Ensuring the Resilience of Logistic Routes: Provision of military-technical support necessary to ensure the security and sustainability of Ukraine’s temporary maritime corridor. This is crucial for stabilizing global prices and eliminating a key source of indirect economic losses (24.1 billion USD due to the fall in domestic prices).⁸
Food Diplomacy and Countering Disinformation: Using detailed, verified international data on Russian crimes to actively debunk disinformation campaigns that attempt to shift responsibility for the global food crisis onto Ukraine or its Western partners.¹⁴
